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Abstract
Doing justice to quantum mechanics calls for a deeper examination
of the relations between our experience, its objects, and its subjects
than either third-person interpretations or the first-person singular
interpretation of the QBist permit. The metaphysical space opened
by Bohr’s employment of the “Kantian wedge” between the objective
world, about which we can communicate, and the world “in itself” al-
lows quantum mechanics to unfold its metaphysical potential. This in
turn makes it possible to go a long way towards bridging the episte-
mological gap between the empirical and transcendental conceptions
of reality.
1 Introduction
Interpretations of quantum mechanics come in a variety of flavors. There
are third-person singular interpretations, which strive to make sense of the
theory while taking for granted the existence a single, self-existent, mind-
independent world. There are third-person plural interpretations, which
posit many worlds or a “multiverse.” There is the first-person singular
interpretation of the QBist or Quantum Bayesian. And then there is the
first-person plural interpretation of Niels Bohr, which drives a “Kantian
wedge” between the objective world, about which we can communicate, and
the world as it may be “in itself,” out of relation to our experience.
The present paper aims to show that a metaphysical framework capable
of doing justice to quantum mechanics may have to be considerably more
complex and wide-ranging than we are generally prepared to envision. Doing
justice to quantum mechanics calls for a deeper examination of the relations
between our experience, its objects, and its subjects than either third-person
interpretations or the first-person singular interpretation permit. Hence,
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this paper is an essay in first-person plural quantum mechanics. Doing
justice to quantum mechanics does not seem possible without making full
use of the metaphysical space opened by Bohr’s employment of the “Kantian
wedge.” This space allows quantum mechanics to unfold its metaphysical
potential, and this makes it possible to go a long way towards bridging the
epistemological gap between “the world as we know it” and “the world in
itself.” Or so I shall argue.
2 Bohr and “experience”
Bohr’s claim was that the classical language is indispensable.
This has remained valid up to the present day. At the individual
level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on pho-
tographs, all measurement results have to be expressed in classi-
cal terms. Indeed, the use of the familiar physical quantities of
length, time, mass, and momentum–energy at a subatomic scale
is due to an extrapolation of the language of classical physics to
the non-classical domain. — Brigitte Falkenburg [1, p. 162]
No one, to my mind, has elucidated our epistemological situation more
clearly than Immanuel Kant in the 18th Century and Niels Bohr again in
the 20th. Kant taught us to distinguish between two concepts of reality,
a transcendental reality and an empirical one, and Bohr stressed the need
for this distinction when he reminded us that “in our description of nature
the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to
track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects
of our experience” [2, pp. 17–18].
Bohr’s reminder has been misconstrued nearly as often as it has been
quoted. To give just one recent example, Mermin [3], in a comment pub-
lished in Nature, maintains that Bohr “taught that physical science studies
our experience.” As far as Bohr is concerned, physical science studies not
our experience qua experience but the objectifiable aspects of our experience.
The reason Bohr refers to the relations between the manifold aspects of our
experience is that it is these relations that make it possible to objectify cer-
tain aspects of our experience—to represent them as aspects of a cognizable
reality from which we, the objectifying subjects, can abstract ourselves. The
logical/grammatical relation between a subject and its predicates makes it
possible for us to think of the manifold aspects of our experience as the
properties of substances (i.e., self-existent objects). Applied to the succes-
sive (or timelike related) aspects of our experience, the conditional relation
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between propositions makes it possible for us to think of these aspects as
properties related by causality. And applied to the simultaneous (or space-
like related) aspects of our experience, the same relation makes it possible
for us to think of these aspects as a self-existent system of objects related
through interaction. The reason Bohr insisted on the use of classical lan-
guage in describing experiments and reporting results was that he considered
the categorial structure implicit in this language a sine qua non of empirical
science. This structure is in all significant respects identical with the system
of categories that Kant had shown to be a precondition of the possibility of
empirical knowledge.
In a talk given three months after the publication of his Nature comment,
Mermin [4] takes a stab at elucidating Bohr’s meaning of “experience”: “by
‘experience’ he almost certainly meant the objective readings of large classi-
cal instruments.” Taken together, the two statements—that physical science
studies our experience, and that experience stands for the objective read-
ings of large classical instruments—imply that, according to Bohr, physical
science studies the objective readings of large classical instruments, which
is a crude statement of instrumentalism and an insult to Bohr.
To determine the import of Bohr’s reminder, one has to take account of
its context [2, p. 17–18]:
Now, what gives to the quantum-theoretical description its pecu-
liar characteristic is just this, that in order to evade the quantum
of action we must use separate experimental arrangements to
obtain accurate measurements of the different quantities, the si-
multaneous knowledge of which would be required for a complete
description based upon the classical theories, and, further, that
these experimental results cannot be supplemented by repeated
measurements. . . . a subsequent measurement to a certain degree
deprives the information given by a previous measurement of its
significance for predicting the future course of the phenomena.
Obviously, these facts not only set a limit to the extent of the in-
formation obtainable by measurements, but they also set a limit
to the meaning which we may attribute to such information. We
meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of
nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phe-
nomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations
between the manifold aspects of our experience.
What Bohr concerned was “the task of bringing order into an entirely new
field of experience” [5, p. 228], a field of experience that places limits on “the
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extent of the information obtainable by measurements” and on “the mean-
ing which we may attribute to such information.” When Bohr spoke of a
“field of experience,” when he insisted that it “lies in the nature of physi-
cal observation, that all experience must ultimately be expressed in terms of
classical concepts” [2], or when he pointed out that “the requirement of com-
municability of the circumstances and results of experiments implies that we
can speak of well defined experiences only within the framework of ordinary
concepts” [6], what he meant by experience was its objectifiable content, i.e.,
an objective reality inevitably conditioned by how we experience it and how
we describe it but not fundamentally dependent for its existence on how we
experience and describe it nor on the fact that we experience and describe
it.
The key to making sense of Bohr, and quite possibly the key to making
sense of quantum mechanics itself, is the distinction between two concepts
of reality:
(I) a transcendental reality undisclosed in experience, which for Kant was
the intrinsically unknowable cause of experience, and
(II) the product of a mental synthesis—a synthesis based on the spatiotem-
poral structure of experience, achieved with the help of relational con-
cepts that derive their meanings from this structure, and resulting in
a knowable empirical reality from which the objectifying subject can
abstract itself.
The reason Bohr insisted that it is not our purpose to “disclose the real
essence of the phenomena” was this: while we can describe reality as we
experience it, we cannot describe reality as it is in itself, regardless of how
it presents itself to us.1
Nothing is more central to Bohr’s views than the dual necessity (i) of
defining observables in terms of the experimental arrangements by which
they are measured and (ii) of describing these arrangements in classical
terms. Because the limits placed on simultaneous measurements of incom-
patible observables imply “a complementarity of the possibilities of defini-
tion” [2, p. 78], observables can no longer be defined without reference to
the “agency of observation” [2, pp. 54, 67] (i.e., the experimental appara-
tus), so that the “procedure of measurement has an essential influence on
the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in
1The necessity of making a clear-cut distinction between a transcendental or “veiled”
reality and a knowable or “empirical” reality has also been stressed by d’Espagnat [7, 8,
9, 10].
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question rests” [11]. The “distinction between object and agency of mea-
surement” is therefore “inherent in our very idea of observation” [2, p. 68].
And since “[o]nly with the help of classical ideas is it possible to ascribe
an unambiguous meaning to the results of observation” [2, p. 94], “it would
be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may
be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new
conceptual forms” [2, p. 16]. For summaries of Bohr’s mature views, which
“remained more or less stable at least over the latter thirty years of Bohr’s
life” [12, p. 138], see Kaiser [13] and MacKinnon [14].
3 Bohr and Kant
In my opinion, those who really want to understand contempo-
rary physics—i.e., not only to apply physics in practice but also
to make it transparent—will find it useful, even indispensable at
a certain stage, to think through Kant’s theory of science.
— Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker [15, p. 328]
Affinities between Bohr and Kant have been noted by a number of com-
mentators [13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], including Cuffaro [24],
who holds that any interpretation of Bohr should start with Kant. Kant
owes his fame in large part to his successful navigation between the Scylla
of transcendental realism (which eventually runs up against the impossible
task of explaining the subject in terms of the object) and the Charybdis of
a Berkeley-style idealism. What allowed him to steer clear of both horns of
the dilemma was a dramatic change of strategy. Instead of trying to formu-
late a metaphysical picture of the world consistent with Newton’s theory,
as he had done during the pre-critical period of his philosophy, he inquired
into the cognitive conditions that are (i) necessary for the possibility of em-
pirical knowledge and (ii) sufficient for the objective status of Newtonian
mechanics. He recognized, as Bitbol [19] has put it, “that the land sought
by metaphysics can be foreign to us not due to the excessive distance we
have with it, but rather due to its excessive proximity to us.”
Kant’s reading of classical mechanics dispelled many qualms that had
been shared by thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century—qualms about
the purely mathematical nature of Newtonian mechanics, about its partial
lack of intelligibility (e.g., action at a distance), and about such unfamiliar
features as Galileo’s principle of relativity. The mathematical nature of
Newton’s theory was justified not by the Neo-Platonic belief that the book of
nature was written in mathematical language but by being a precondition of
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empirical knowledge. What permits us to look upon the manifold aspects of
our experience as the constituents of an objective world is the mathematical
regularities that exist between them. They make it possible to synthesize
these aspects into a system of interacting re-identifiable objects.
Similarly, Newton’s refusal to explain gravitational action at a distance
was due not to any incompleteness of his theory but to the fact that the
only causality available to us consists in the same regular mathematical
connection that permits us to objectify “relations between the manifold
aspects of our experience,” as Bohr put it a couple of centuries later. As for
Galileo’s principle of relativity, which asserts that motion is always relative,
it is a direct consequence of the fact that regular mathematical connections
only exists between particular aspects of experience, i.e., between successive
events and between coexisting objects, but never between a particular aspect
of experience and either of the general forms of experience, time and space.
In the course of the nineteenth century, most philosophers and appar-
ently many of the scientists who cared to reflect on the nature of science came
to adopt (or, in some cases, reinvent) Kant’s epistemology. It alleviated the
loss of transcendental realism by justifying the use of a universal objectivist
language, which made it possible to think and behave as if transcendental
realism were true. The advent of quantum mechanics dealt a severe blow to
this comfortable attitude. Atoms respected neither Kant’s apriorism, such
as the assertion that the possibility of empirical knowledge requires the uni-
versal validity of the law of causality, nor his principle of thoroughgoing
determination, which asserts that “among all possible predicates of things,
insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply to [each
thing] as to its possibility” [25, p. 553]. Neither Kant’s apriorism nor his
principle of thoroughgoing determination, however, though significant ele-
ments of his thinking, are central to his theory of science. Hence, there
are more ways to respond to this blow than relapsing into transcendental
realism, embracing a Berkeley-style idealism, or resigning oneself to a meta-
physically sterile instrumentalism. In Bohr’s case, MacKinnon writes, the
crisis
precipitated something akin to a Gestalt shift, a shift in focal at-
tention from the objects studied to the conceptual system used
to study them. This effect was somewhat similar to the epoche´
advocated by Husserl. He stressed the need for philosophers to
bracket the natural standpoint and consider it as a represen-
tational system, rather than the reality represented. Similarly,
Bohr’s realization of the essential failure of the pictures in space
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and time on which the description of natural phenomena have
hitherto been based shifted the focus of attention from the phe-
nomena represented to the system that served as a vehicle of
representation. [14, p. 97]
Bohr’s “epoche´” mirrors the seminal change of strategy that had enabled
Kant to navigate between the Scylla of realism and the Charybdis of ide-
alism. Where Kant had famously stressed that “[t]houghts without con-
tent are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” [25, p. 193], Bohr
might have said that without measurements the formal apparatus of quan-
tum mechanics is empty, while measurements without the formal apparatus
of quantum mechanics are blind. What permits us to look beyond the di-
rectly experienced world, which is amenable to classical description, is the
mutual exclusion of experimental procedures, but this also means that there
is no quantum world that can be described independently of our experimen-
tal investigations: “it is only the mutual exclusion of any two experimental
procedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complementary phys-
ical quantities, which provides room for new physical laws, the co-existence
of which might at first sight appear irreconcilable with the basic principles
of science” [26, p. 61]. To look beyond the classically describable world, one
needs the quantum-mechanical formalism, and one needs experimental ar-
rangements situated in that world, “the specification of which is imperative
for any well-defined application of the quantum-mechanical formalism” [26,
p. 57].
For Bohr, as for Kant, there is an intimate connection between percep-
tion, which is conditioned by the spatiotemporal aspects of experience, and
conception. For Kant, conception organizes the content of experience into an
effectively subject-independent world of re-identifiable objects and causally
connected events. For Bohr, conception provides the framework necessary
for the formulation of unambiguous, communicable knowledge, which is re-
quired for a clear-cut separation of the subject from the object: “all subjec-
tivity is avoided by proper attention to the circumstances required for the
well-defined use of elementary physical concepts” [27, pp. 7]. Far from in-
validating Kant’s epistemological stance, quantum theory reminds us of the
roles perception and conception play in the construction and constitution
of the objective world. Bohr’s departure from Kant is not a departure from
Kant’s epistemological stance but a consequence of quantum theory’s depar-
ture from classical physics. By limiting the application of classical concepts,
quantum theory extends the range of phenomena within our ken. It is an
irony that Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing for the a priori necessity of classical
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concepts, regarded complementarity as an alternative to Kant’s theory of
science, thus drawing the battle lines in a way which put Kant and himself
on opposing sides.
What allowed Bohr to go beyond Kant was his insight that empirical
knowledge is not limited to what is accessible to our senses, and that it does
not have to be a knowledge of interacting objects and causally connected
events. It can reach beyond what is directly accessible to our senses. What
it finds there, however, cannot be expected to be structured in the same way
as what is directly accessible to our senses. We have no reason to expect
that what is not directly accessible to our senses is subject to the spatiotem-
poral conditions of sensory experience, and we have no reason to expect that
what is not subject to these conditions conforms to descriptions or expla-
nations involving such spatiotemporal concepts as position and momentum,
time and energy, causality and interaction. Since these are essentially all
the descriptive and explanatory (or kinematical and dynamical) concepts at
our disposal, it should have come as no surprise that what is not directly
accessible to our senses can only be described in terms of correlations be-
tween events that are directly accessible to our senses. Bohr stands virtually
alone with his insight that reality cannot be “squeezed” into Kant’s “pure
forms of experience,” space and time. “It is my personal opinion,” he wrote
to the philosopher Harald Høffding [28], “that these difficulties are of such
a nature that they hardly allow us to hope that we shall be able, within the
world of the atom, to carry through a description in space and time that
corresponds to our ordinary sensory perceptions.”
I cannot but agree with Folse when he writes [22]: “It is often said that
a work of genius resists categorization. If so, Bohr’s philosophical viewpoint
easily passes this criterion of greatness. Surely this is one of the reasons for
the commonplace complaints over Bohr’s ‘obscurity’.” Historically, Bohr’s
reply [29] to the EPR paper was taken as a definitive refutation by the
physics community. By the time interpreting quantum mechanics became a
growth industry, Bohr’s perspective was lost. His epistemological reflections
generally came to be treated on a par with a proliferating multitude of on-
tological interpretations of a mathematically formulated theory, and as such
they could not but seem amateurish, outdated, ad hoc, bizarre, or downright
irrational. This is how Jeffrey Bub [30, pp. 45–46] came to conclude that
The careful phraseology of complementarity . . . endows an un-
acceptable theory of measurement with mystery and apparent
profundity, where clarity would reveal an unsolved problem,
how Abner Shimony [31] came to confess that
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after 25 years of attentive—and even reverent—reading of Bohr,
I have not found a consistent and comprehensive framework for
the interpretation of quantum mechanics,
and how Edwin Jaynes [32] came to see in “our present QM formalism”
a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part
incomplete human information about Nature—all scrambled up
by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen
how to unscramble.
It would therefore seem appropriate to close this section with the following
words by Hooker [12, pp. 132–133]:
it is a remarkable commentary on the state of confusion and
misunderstanding now existing in the field that Bohr’s unique
views are almost universally either overlooked completely or dis-
torted beyond recognition—this by philosophers of science and
scientists alike. Despite the fact that there are almost as many
philosophies of quantum theory as there are major quantum the-
orists, the illusion somehow persists that they are all talking
about the same thing and in essentially the same way. . . . so
many people can apparently read Bohr and not grasp the signif-
icance of what he was driving at.
4 The measurement problem
The most satisfying way to end a philosophical dispute is to find
a false presupposition that underlies all the puzzles it involves.
— Bas C. Van Fraassen [33, p. 434]
What distinguishes Bohr’s unique views from other quantum philosophies
is his recognition of the objective middle-ground between the experienc-
ing subject and the transcendental object—a knowable reality that, while
being ontologically rooted in an epistemically inaccessible object, is episte-
mologically rooted in the experiencing and objectifying subject. Failure to
distinguish the empirical (type-II) reality from the transcendental (type-I)
reality leads to two fruitless lines of attack on the quantum measurement
problem. This, as Mermin [34, p. 156] has pointed out, has two major
components: “The first is how to account for an objective physical process
called the collapse of the wave function, which supersedes the normal uni-
tary time evolution of the quantum state in special physical processes known
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as measurements.” The second concerns the question “whether there can
be quantum interference between quantum states that describe macroscopi-
cally distinct physical conditions,” including the challenge of elucidating the
meaning of “macroscopically distinct.”
The first fruitless line of attack is the way of the ψ-ontologists,2 who be-
lieve in an objective physical process called the collapse of the wave function,
and who take “objective” in the sense of referring to a mind-independently
existing reality that, in and of itself, is just as the wave function describes
it. That this line of attack is doomed to fail follows from insolubility proofs
of the so-called objectification problem due to Mittelstaedt [36, Sect. 4.3b]
and Busch et al. [37, Sect. III.6.2].
The peculiar meaning of “objectification” in the literature on the quan-
tum measurement problem must not be confused with the regular sense of
the word, which refers to the representation of a concept as a real or concrete
object. This literature, which still follows the first rigorous formulations of
the problem in the monographs of von Neumann [38] and Pauli [39], as-
sumes that there is such a thing as a measurement process, and that this
takes place in three steps: the system or state preparation, a continuous
dynamical process called “premeasurement” (p), and the appearance of an
outcome called “objectification” (o):∑
k
ck|A0〉|qk〉 (p)−→
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉 (o)−→ |A(q)〉|q〉.
The initial state assigns probability 1 to the outcome of a measurement
which indicates that the apparatus is ready, and the final state assigns
probability 1 to the outcome of a measurement which indicates that the
apparatus indicates the outcome q. To make the initial state represent the
fact that the apparatus is in the neutral state, and to make the final state
represent the fact that the apparatus indicates the outcome q, one has to
adopt the so-called eigenvalue-eigenstate link as an interpretive principle.
Here is how it was formulated by Dirac [40, pp. 46–47]:
The expression that an observable “has a particular value” for
a particular state is permissible . . . in the special case when a
measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular
value, so that the state is an eigenstate of the observable.
2Not to be confused with Scientologists. For the origin of this subtly suggestive term
see Note 3 of Ref. [35].
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So even if we had an explanation for the collapse transition from
∑
k ck|Ak〉|qk〉
to |A(q)〉|q〉, it would not explain the objectification transition from prob-
ability 1 to “is” or “has.” Nor could it, for there can be no dynamical
explanation for an interpretive principle like the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
The second fruitless line of attack is the way of the QBists [35, 41, 42, 43].
QBists hold that quantum theory is an addition to Bayesian probability
theory. It provides “users of science” with a calculus for gambling on their
respective experiences. Because users’ experiences generally differ, QBists
believe that there are potentially as many quantum states for a given sys-
tem as there are users of the theory. While they agree with Bohr that the
events to which quantum mechanics assigns probabilities are measurement
outcomes, they define “measurement” as an “action an agent takes to elicit
a set of possible experiences,” and they define a “measurement outcome” as
“the particular experience of that agent elicited in this way” [44]. Because
measurement outcomes are relative to individual users/agents, a QBist has
to subject everything but her “own direct internal awareness of her own
private experience” to the superposition principle, including reports of mea-
surement outcomes she has yet to receive.
Missing the middle-ground between the experiencing subject and the
transcendental object, QBists blame the trouble we face in our attempts to
beat sense into the quantum theory on “our ingrained practice of divorcing
the objects of our investigations from the subjective experiences they induce
in us” [44]. In doing so, they conflate two distinct concepts of reality, iden-
tifying the type-II reality investigated by us with the type-I reality inducing
experiences in us.3 What is responsible for our interpretive predicament
is not our practice of divorcing the objects of our investigations from our
subjective experiences but our practice of not distinguishing between the
objects of our investigations, which belong to the type-II reality objectified
by us, and whatever it is that induces subjective experiences in us, which
belongs to the epistemically inaccessible reality of type I.
One may wonder how Fuchs et al. [44] come to assert that “Instruments
are the Copenhagen surrogate for experience,” or how Mermin—“a QBist in
the making” [46]—arrives at the conclusion that “All versions of Copenhagen
3This conflation is also responsible for the insolubility of the “hard problem of con-
sciousness,” which most philosophers of mind—including David Chalmers [45], who coined
the phrase—take to be the problem of explaining how physical processes in a brain give
rise to subjective experience. Since the empirically known brain with its empirically know-
able processes is conditioned by the spatiotemporal structure of our experience, it cannot
be what gives rise to our experience (including its spatiotemporal structure). See also
Sect. 11.
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objectify each of the diverse family of users of science into a single common
piece of apparatus” [4]. The reasons for these seemingly bizarre claims can be
discovered by comparing three different views on how subjects, instruments,
and the quantum world are related—Bohr’s view, the QBist view, and Bohr’s
view as misconstrued by QBists.
For Bohr, the possibility of drawing a line of separation between subject
and object, in such a way as to be able to refer to objects without referring to
our experiences, is a sine qua non of empirical science. This possibility calls
for a language that is suitable for unambiguous communication, and only
the language of interacting objects and causally connected events meets this
demand. The need for this language has nothing to do with the particular
field of experience to which it is applied. Because it remains the same when-
ever we stumble upon a new field of experience, “there is, strictly speaking,
no new observational problem in atomic physics” [26, p. 89]. There is no
new observational problem because in quantum physics we are doing what
we have always done: setting up experiments and reporting their results,
in a language suitable for unambiguous communication, which Bohr used
to call “plain language,” “classical language,” or “the language of classical
physics.” (Bohr never asserted that quantum mechanics requires classical
physics itself.)
What is new, and radically so, is that the properties of quantum sys-
tems are defined by the experimental conditions in which they are mea-
sured, and that they only exist if and when they are measured. Instead
of being “the Copenhagen surrogate for experience,” instruments open up
a new and wholly unanticipated field of experience—a field of experience
that does not permit itself to be conceived as an autonomous system of ob-
jects with causally connected intrinsic properties but, instead, evinces itself
through statistical correlations between (classically describable) prepara-
tions and (classically describable) outcomes.
According to Bohr [27, p. 12], “the physical content of quantum me-
chanics is exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing
observations obtained under conditions specified in plain language”.4 The
irreducible empirical core of quantum mechanics is a calculus of correlations,
but so is the irreducible empirical core of classical mechanics, as was pointed
out by Mermin [47]. What distinguishes the two is that the latter is trivial,
in the sense that it only assigns the trivial probabilities 0 or 1. This allows us
4Having said that “QBism, like most varieties of Copenhagen, takes the quantum state
of a system to be not an objective property of that system, but a mathematical tool for
thinking about the system,” Mermin [4] adds: “Bohr may well have believed it but never
spelled it out as explicitly.” Actually he did.
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to think of the state of a classical system in the classical sense of “state”—a
collection of possessed properties—and to believe that if the probability of
finding a property of the system is 1, this is because the system has this
property. In other words, we are free to interpret the classical correlation
laws as causal laws.
When we come to quantum mechanics, the classically describable world
does not wholly disappear, for it contains the correlata whose existence
quantum mechanics presupposes and therefore has to take for granted. Nor
do the quantum-mechanical correlations supplant all classical correlations,
for without the latter it would not be possible to synthesize an objective
world from which the objectifying subjects can abstract themselves. This
disposes of both components of the measurement problem. The first com-
ponent does not exist for Bohr because what happens between a system
preparation and a measurement is a holistic phenomenon, which cannot be
dissected into the unitary evolution of a quantum state and a subsequent
“collapse”:
all unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical for-
malism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining
the initial state of the atomic system concerned and the charac-
ter of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable
properties of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory
can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial state or
to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination
of measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined
phenomenon. [48]
Nor does the question whether there can be quantum interference between
quantum states describing macroscopically distinct physical conditions arise
for Bohr, since macroscopically distinct physical conditions are directly ac-
cessible to our senses, and what is directly accessible to our senses is subject
to Kant’s principle of thoroughgoing determination.
Bohr’s view on how subjects, instruments, and the quantum world are
related may thus be summarized like this: instruments exist in the world
objectified by the community of rational subjects sharing the same spa-
tiotemporal mode of perception, and so does the quantum world—the world
described by whatever can be inferred from measurement outcomes and from
the quantum correlations between them.
Having declared that “Instruments are the Copenhagen surrogate for ex-
perience,” Fuchs et al. go on to claim that “Being objective and independent
of the agent using them, instruments miss the central point of QBism, giving
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rise to the notorious measurement problem, which has vexed physicists to
this day” [44]. What actually gives rise to the measurement problem is, as
Mermin himself has put it elsewhere, “our habit of inappropriately reifying
our successful abstractions” [47], a habit of which Bohr would be the last
person to be accused. When Bohr says that instruments are objective and
independent of agents, QBists appear to hear him say that instruments are
part of a reality that exists independently of how it presents itself to us and
how we describe it. But this impression was explicitly repudiated by Bohr
when he said, as quoted by Petersen [49], that “It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we
can say about nature.” What exists independently of how it presents itself
to us and how we describe it is epistemically inaccessible to us. Instruments
are objective and independent of agents in the sense that some of their
properties—in particular their outcome-indicating properties—are directly
perceptible by suitably located subjects and therefore definite (i.e., subject
to Kant’s principle of thoroughgoing determination). They can consistently
be represented as objective by those who are aware of them, and they can
consistently be considered definite by those not aware of them. They are
objective in the sense of belonging to an objectifiable nexus of interacting
objects and causally related events from which the objectifying subjects can
abstract themselves.
5 The QBist Agenda
That the world should violate Bell’s theorem remains, even for
QBism, the deepest statement ever drawn from quantum theory.
— Christopher A. Fuchs [35]
Two points appear to dominate the QBist agenda: the construal of quantum-
mechanical probabilities as single-user Bayesian probabilities and the inten-
tion to put “the scientist back into science” [3]. (A third point will be
addressed below.) The Bayesian understanding of probability as a degree
of confidence or belief, however, is unsuited for an interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, for it denies the existence of external criteria—external to
the individual subject—for declaring a probability judgment right or wrong,
whereas in fact there are such criteria, to wit, the measurement outcomes on
the basis of which probabilities are assigned with the help of the quantum-
mechanical correlation laws. These criteria are external in the sense of be-
longing to the objectified, empirical reality of type II. The need to restore
“the balance between subject and object” [3], on the other hand, arises only
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if the object is conceived as belonging to a reality that exists independently
of how it presents itself to us and how we describe it.
In his essay “Nature and the Greeks” [50, pp. 95–97], Schro¨dinger de-
plores that “I actually do cut out my mind when I construct the real world
around me”:
the scientific picture of the real world around me is very deficient.
It . . . is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near
to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word
about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical
delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God
and eternity. . . . And the reason for this disconcerting situation
is just this, that, for the purpose of constructing the picture of
the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying device
or cutting our own personality out, removing it.
For Fuchs et al. [44] this is reason enough to claim that Schro¨dinger “takes
a QBist view of science.” It is true that Schro¨dinger takes a QBist view of
science, but only insofar as he, too, takes the scientific picture of the real
world around him to refer to a reality that exists independently of how it
presents itself to us and how we describe it. But such a reality is epistemi-
cally inaccessible. The empirically accessible reality around us—the reality
we perceive and describe—is our own creation, extracted from our experi-
ence, objectified and shared by subjects like ourselves. The reason we do not
find in it the qualitative aspects of our experience is that our experience en-
compasses and exceeds it. That these aspects are missing from it—that they
cannot be objectified—ought to worry only those who disregard this funda-
mental truth about our epistemological situation. (Unfortunately that’s a
lot of people.)
It deserves to be stressed that the qualitative aspects of our experience
include the qualitative aspects of time and space. Weyl [51] made this point
with respect to space, stressing “with what little right mathematics may
claim to expose the intuitional nature of space”:
Geometry contains no trace of that which makes the space of
intuition what it is in virtue of its own entirely distinctive qual-
ities which are not shared by “states of addition-machines” and
“gas-mixtures” and “systems of solutions of linear equations”. It
is left to metaphysics to make this “comprehensible” or indeed
to show why and in what sense it is incomprehensible. We as
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Figure 1: Do Alice and Bob see a teapot because there is a teapot, or is
there a teapot because they each see one?
mathematicians . . . must recognise with humility that our con-
ceptual theories enable us to grasp only one aspect of the nature
of space, that which, moreover, is most formal and superficial.
Much the same applies to time. What we can objectify are the spatial rela-
tions between objects and the temporal or spatiotemporal relations between
events. What we cannot objectify is the qualitative character of the warp
and woof of our experience, phenomenal space and phenomenal time, in-
cluding our subjective here and now. As I cannot objectify the particular
point in space from which I surveys my surroundings—a fact that nobody
seems to bemoan—so I cannot objectify my now as a particular point in
time at which I remember my past and anticipate my future—a fact that
Einstein famously regretted [52] and that Mermin [3, 53] believes QBism
can redress.
The QBist view on how subjects, instruments, and the quantum world
are related may now be summarized like this: Definite outcomes only exist in
the individual user/agent’s private experience, and so do definite properties
in general and the outcome-indicating properties of instruments in particu-
lar. The quantum world is the “little more” [54] which requires outcome-
indicating experiences to be correlated as codified by the laws of quantum
mechanics. Thus if Alice and Bob both experience a teapot placed between
them (Fig. 1), it is not because there is a real teapot out there, nor is it, as
Kant and Bohr could have argued, because they can consistently represent
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the experienced teapot as being part of a shared objective world. A QBist
would paraphrase either explanation by saying that it objectifies both Alice
and Bob into a single common teapot. This is how Mermin comes to con-
clude that “All versions of Copenhagen objectify each of the diverse family
of users of science into a single common piece of apparatus” [4].
The third point on the QBist agenda is a demonstration that quantum
mechanics is “explicitly local” [44]. The demonstration consists in the claim
that “space-like separated events . . . cannot be experienced by any single
agent,” and that therefore quantum correlations “refer only to time-like
separated events: the acquisition of experiences by any single agent.” (In
point of fact, spacelike separated events can be experienced by a single user,
provided that both events are situated in or on that user’s past light cone.)
By giving “each quantum state a home . . . localized in space and time—
namely, the physical site of the agent who assigns it,” QBism “expels once
and for all the fear that quantum mechanics leads to ‘spooky action at a
distance’.” [55]
It is true that each quantum state—in fact, every calculational tool of
every physical theory—has a “home” in someone’s mind, but if definite
properties (including the property of being physically located somewhere)
only exist in the minds of individual agents, this cannot mean that each
quantum state exists at the physical location of the agent who assigns it.
For QBists, to be is to be measured, and to be measured is to be experienced.
Unexperienced properties do not exist. For Bob, Alice’s location is her
location as experienced/measured by him, and for Alice, Bob’s location is
his location as experienced/measured by her. The circularity implied by
locating an agent’s state of mind relatively to another agent’s state of mind
should be obvious.
It is not that easy to expel the fear that quantum mechanics leads to
spooky action at a distance.5 If Alice and Bob perform the test of Bell’s
theorem so beautifully designed by the earlier Mermin [56] (Fig. 2), Alice
can use her outcome to predict with certainty the outcome that Bob obtains
if he measures the same spin component as Alice (and vice versa). While
her measurement changes nothing either in Bob’s mind or at Bob’s absolute
5In point of fact, the diachronic correlations between events in timelike relation are
as spooky as the synchronic correlations between events in spacelike relation. While we
know how to calculate either kind of correlation, and therefore know how to calculate the
probabilities of possible events on the basis of actual events, we know as little of a physical
process by which an event here and now contributes to determine the probability of a later
event here as we know of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes
to determine the probability of a distant event now.
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Figure 2: Can Alice predict Bob’s outcome because it reveals something
that is the case at Bob’s absolute location, or is something the case at
Bob’s location as it exists in Alice’s mind because Alice can predict Bob’s
outcome?
location, it does change something at Bob’s location as it exists in Alice’s
mind: Alice can assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of each of Bob’s
possible measurements. QBists will argue that this violation of outcome-
independence is an explicitly local effect, happening in Alice’s mind, but
the implication that there is no distance between Alice and Bob other than
that existing in an individual user’s mind makes their argument rather self-
defeating.
6 Consistency
The measurement problem is a consistency problem. What we
have to show is that the dynamics, which generally produces en-
tanglement between two coupled systems, is consistent with the
assumption that something definite or determinate happens in a
measurement process. The basic question is whether it is consis-
tent with the unitary dynamics to take the macroscopic measure-
ment “pointer” or, in general, the macroworld as definite. The
answer is “no,” if we accept an interpretative principle some-
times referred to as the “eigenvalue-eigenstate link.”
— Jeffrey Bub [57]
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As long as we espouse the interpretive principle known as the eigenvalue–
eigenstate link, we have a consistency problem. Bub [57] has claimed that
the unitary quantum dynamics can be made consistent with the existence of
measurement outcomes by stipulating instead that “the decoherence ‘pointer’
selected by environmental decoherence” is always definite. Decoherence then
“guarantees the continued definiteness or persistent objectivity of the macro-
world.” Decoherence, however, merely displaces the coherence of the system
composed of apparatus and object system into the degrees of freedom of the
environment, causing the objectification problem to reappear as a statement
about the system composed of environment, apparatus, and object system.
Since the mixture obtained by tracing out the environment does not admit
an ignorance interpretation, it can resolve the problem only FAPP (“for all
practical purposes”).
To demonstrate the consistency of the quantum-mechanical correlation
laws with the existence of their correlata,6 which really ought to be self-
evident, we must desist from conceiving of the objective world as if it were
directly accessible to our senses on all scales. The objective world is not
the epistemically inaccessible (type-I) world—the world as it is in itself,
unperceived and unconceived by us. Nor is it the world as we perceive it.
The objective world is the world as we conceive it, and if we want our
conception of it to be consistent with the quantum-mechanical correlations
laws, we must not conceive of it as if it were spatially differentiated (or
partitioned) “all the way down,” which is what the insolubility proofs of the
objectification problem implicitly assume.
The first part of the demonstration of consistency consists in showing
that quantum mechanics itself implies the incompleteness of the world’s spa-
tiotemporal differentiation. The second part consists in deducing from this
the existence of a non-empty class of objects whose positions are “smeared
out” only relative to an imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more
differentiated than the actual world [59, 60, 61, 62, 63].
Part 1. While quantum mechanics can tell us that the probability of
finding a particle in a given region of space is 1, it is incapable of giving us a
region of space. For this a detector is needed. A detector is needed not only
to indicate the presence of a particle in a region but also—and in the first
place—to realize a region, so as to make it possible to attribute to a parti-
cle the property of being inside. Speaking more generally, a measurement
6This is an example of what von Weizsa¨cker [58, p. 260] has called “semantic con-
sistency”: “Semantic consistency of a theory will mean that its preconceptions, how we
interpret the mathematical structure physically, will themselves obey the laws of the the-
ory.”
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apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a property by a
quantum system but also—and in the first place—to realize a set of prop-
erties so as to make them available for attribution to the system.7 But if
detectors are needed to realize regions of space, space cannot be intrinsically
partitioned; it cannot be modeled as an actually existing manifold of points
labeled by triplets of real numbers. If at all we conceive of it as partitioned,
we can do so only as far as regions of space can be realized—i.e., to the
extent that the requisite detectors are physically realizable. Because this
extent is limited by the indeterminacy principle, the spatial differentiation
of the objective (type-II) world is incomplete.
Part 2. In an incompletely differentiated world, there will be objects
whose position distributions are and remain so narrow that there are no
detectors with narrower position distributions. If anything truly deserves the
label “macroscopic,” it is these objects. While decoherence arguments can
solve the objectification problem only FAPP, they quantitatively support the
existence of macroscopic positions—positions whose indefiniteness is never
revealed in the only way it could be revealed, i.e., through a departure
from what the classical laws predict. The testable correlations between the
outcomes of measurements of macroscopic positions are therefore consistent
with both the classical and the quantum laws. This makes it possible to
attribute to macroscopic positions a measurement-independent reality, and
it enables them to define the obtainable values of observables and to indicate
the outcomes of measurements.
7 Beyond consistency
The ever-popular wavefunction formulation is standard for prob-
lem solving, but leaves the conceptual misimpression that wave-
function is a physical entity rather than a mathematical tool. The
path integral formulation is physically appealing and generalizes
readily beyond the domain of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics,
but is laborious in most standard applications.
— Daniel F. Styer et al. [64]
Having demonstrated the consistency of the quantum-mechanical correlation
7Just as (macroscopic) detectors are needed to realize attributable positions, so (macro-
scopic) clocks are needed to realize attributable times. This means that the wave function’s
dependence on time is not the continuous time-dependence of an evolving physical state.
The t in ψ(t) refers to the macroscopically realized and indicated time of the measurement
to the possible outcomes of which ψ(t) serves to assign probabilities.
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laws with the existence of their correlata, our next order of business is to
discern features of the quantum world—to infer them from the quantum-
mechanical correlation laws. For this we need an interpretive principle to
replace the untenable eigenvalue–eigenstate link.
An interpretive principle is intended to answer a question that arises
in the context of a specific formulation of quantum mechanics. Both the
wave function formulation and Feynman’s [65] feature a pair of dynamical
principles. In the former formulation they are unitary evolution and collapse,
in the latter they are summation over amplitudes (followed by taking the
absolute square of the sum) and summation over probabilities (preceded by
taking the absolute square of each amplitude). From the wave-function point
of view, unitary evolution is “normal” and hence not in need of explanation;
what calls for explanation is collapse. From Feynman’s point of view, adding
probabilities is “normal,” as it is what classical probability theory leads us
to expect; what calls for explanation is why we have to add amplitudes
whenever we are required to do so.
The reason the wave-function formulation forces us to postulate collapse,
whose immediate consequence is probability 1 for a particular outcome, is
the eigenvalue–eigenstate link, inasmuch as this equates probability 1 with
the indisputable factuality of measurement outcomes. What could be the
reason Feynman’s formulation requires us to add amplitudes? This question
is answered by the following interpretive principle [59, 60, 61, 62, 63]:
(I) Whenever quantum mechanics requires us to add amplitudes, the distinc-
tions we make between the alternatives correspond to nothing in the physical
world.
Thus while the wave-function formulation stumps us with the dual problem
of collapse and objectification, Feynman’s formulation presents us with a
question to which there is a straightforward answer. We know why
Any determination of the alternative taken by a process capable
of following more than one alternative destroys the interference
between alternatives [65].
By stating the indeterminacy principle in this way, Feynman does not mean
to imply that the “destruction” is brought about by a physical process.
Applied to a two-way interferometer experiment, the replacement (I) for
the eigenvalue–eigenstate link tells us that the distinction we make between
“the particle went through the left arm” and “the particle went through
the right arm” corresponds to nothing in the physical world. Since this
distinction rests on a distinction between regions of space, it follows that
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space cannot be an intrinsically differentiated expanse. Its so-called parts
need to be physically realized, and we have seen that the indeterminacy
principle prevents them from being realized “all the way down.”
8 Being
I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college at
Princeton from Professor Wheeler, in which he said, “Feynman,
I know why all electrons have the same charge and the same
mass.” “Why?” “Because, they are all the same electron!”
— Richard P. Feynman [66]
Applied to an elastic scattering event involving two particles of the same type
(say, two incoming particles N and S, two outgoing particles E and W ), the
interpretive principle (I) tells us that the distinction we make between the
alternative identifications
N → E,S →W and N →W,S → E
corresponds to nothing in the physical world. There is no answer to the
question: “Which outgoing particle is identical with which incoming par-
ticle?” Now why would that be so? Here too there is a straightforward
answer: because the incoming particles (and therefore the outgoing ones as
well) are one and the same entity. What’s more, there is no compelling
reason to believe that this identity ceases when it ceases to have observable
consequences owing to the presence of individuating properties. We are free
to take the view that intrinsically each particle is numerically identical with
every other particle. What presents itself here and now with these proper-
ties and what presents itself there and then with those properties is one and
the same entity.8 In what follows I shall call it “Being.” (If you prefer any
other name, be my guest.)
Perhaps the main reason it is so hard to make sense of the quantum
theory is that it answers a question we are not in the habit of asking. Instead
of asking what the ultimate constituents of matter are and how they interact
and combine, we should ask: how are forms manifested? This question, too,
has a straightforward answer [61, 62]: The shapes of things are manifested
8According to French [67], quantum mechanics is “compatible with two distinct meta-
physical ‘packages,’ one in which the particles are regarded as individuals and one in which
they are not.” Esfeld [68] disagrees: it is not “a serious option to regard quantum objects
as possessing a primitive thisness (haecceity) so that permuting these objects amounts to
a real difference.”
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with the help of reflexive spatial relations. By entering into reflexive spatial
relations, Being gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if
the reflexive quality of the relations is ignored and (ii) what looks like a
substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. As Leibniz
said, omnibus ex nihilo ducendis sufficit unum—one is enough to create
everything from nothing. A single self-existent entity is enough to create
both the relata we call particles and the expanse we call space.
The following brief reflection leads to the same conclusion. While the
non-relativistic theory allows us to conceive of a physical system as being
composed of a definite number of parts, and to conceive of its form as being
composed of a definite number of spatial relations (to which values can
be attributed only if and when they are measured), the relativistic theory
requires us to treat the number of a system’s parts as just another quantum
observable, which has a definite value only if and when it is measured. There
is therefore a clear sense in which a quantum system is always one, the
number of its parts being just one of its properties and having a definite
value only if and when measured.
To my mind, the most fruitful way to understand the necessary distinc-
tion between the classical or macroscopic domain (containing measurement-
independent properties) and the non-classical or quantum domain (whose
properties exist only if, when, and to the extent that they are measured)
is that it is essentially a distinction between the manifested world and its
manifestation. The curious mutual dependence of the two domains, pointed
out by Landau and Lifshitz9 and by Redhead,10 is then readily understood.
The manifestation of the world consists in a transition from a condition of
complete indefiniteness and indistinguishability to a condition of complete or
maximal definiteness and distinguishability, and what occurs in the course of
this transition—what is not completely definite or distinguishable—can only
be described in terms of probability distributions over what is completely
definite and distinguishable. What is instrumental in the manifestation of
the world can only be described in terms of its result, the manifested world.11
Quantum mechanics, this amounts to saying, presents us with a so far un-
9“[Q]uantum mechanics . . . contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the
same time it requires this limiting case for its own formulation” [69, p. 3].
10“In a sense the reduction instead of descending linearly towards the elementary par-
ticles, moves in a circle, linking the reductive basis back to the higher levels” [70].
11It is worth noting here that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics is rooted in
an underlying indeterminacy. Instead of consisting fundamentally in the existence of
unpredictable changes disrupting a predictable evolution, it is a consequence of indetermi-
nacies that evince themselves through unpredictable transitions in the values of outcome-
indicating positions (Bub’s “decoherence pointers”).
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recognized kind of causality—unrecognized, I believe, within the scientific
literature albeit well-known to metaphysics, for the general philosophical
pattern of a single world-essence manifesting itself as a multiplicity of physi-
cal individuals is found throughout the world.12 This causality is associated
with the atemporal process of manifestation, which effects the transition
from complete indefiniteness and indistinguishability to complete or max-
imal definiteness and distinguishability. It must not be confused with its
familiar temporal cousin, which links states or events across time or space-
time. The latter plays no role in the manifestation. Being part of the world
drama, it does not take part in setting the stage for it.13
The causality associated with the process of manifestation casts new light
on quantum theory’s mysterious violation of outcome-independence. The
reason why local explanations do not work may be the same as the reason
why the manifestation of the spatiotemporal world cannot be explained by
processes that connect events within the spacetime arena. The manifestation
of the world is the nonlocal event par excellence. Instead of being an event in
spacetime, it is coextensive with spacetime. Its atemporal causality supports
the folk causality, which helps us make sense of the manifested world as
well as of the cognate world of classical physics, but which throws no light
on the process of manifestation nor on the quantum correlations that are
instrumental in the process.
9 Match of fit?
I see our scientific theories as human inventions—nets designed
by us to catch the world. . . . They are rational nets of our own
making, and should not be mistaken for a complete representation
of the real world in all its aspects. . . .
— Karl R. Popper [75, p. 42]
An intrinsically undifferentiated (and therefore unqualifiable) Being man-
ifesting the world by entering into reflexive relations—does not this refer
to a transcendental (type-I) reality, rather than to a type-II reality experi-
enced and conceived by us? Even if it did, we would not be in a position
12Some of its representatives in the Western hemisphere are the Neoplatonists, John
Scottus Eriugena, and the German idealists. The quintessential Eastern example is the
original (pre-illusionist) Vedanta of the Upanishads [71, 72, 73].
13Ladyman and Ross [74, pp. 258, 280] concur: “the idea of causation has similar status
to those of cohesion, forces, and [individual] things. It is a concept that structures the
notional worlds of observers. . . . There is no justification for the neo-scholastic projection
of causation all the way down to fundamental physics and metaphysics.”
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to know this. As the Greek philosopher–poet Xenophanes pointed out some
twenty-five centuries ago, even if our conceptions represented the world ex-
actly as it is, we could never know that this is the case. But then there is
this flipside: the fact that our models of reality are mental constructs does
nothing to explain why most of our theoretical constructs turn out to be
non-objectifiable. There has to be something about the (type-I) reality at
the origin of our perceptions that licenses the objectification of only a very
limited set of mental constructs. This cannot mean that the “world as we
know it” faithfully represents the “world in itself”; something surely slips
through the interstices of our nets designed to catch the world. But while
we must not jump to the conclusion that the “world as we know it” matches
the “world in itself,” we may conclude that the former fits the latter.
The distinction between a match and a fit is due to von Glasersfeld [76].
He illustrated it by imagining a skipper who, in the dark of a stormy night,
without navigational aids, passes a narrow strait whose contour he does not
know. Epistemologically, we are in the skipper’s position. If he reaches the
open sea without mishap, he has found a course that fits the strait; if next
time he takes the same course, he will again pass safely. What he has not
obtained is a map that matches the coastline. To precisely locate at least
one point of the coastline, he must come into contact with it—at the risk of
wrecking his ship. My contention is that the ideas put forward here and in
greater detail in Refs. [61, 62] fit the reality at the origin of our perceptions.
No interpretation of quantum mechanics can achieve more than that.
We live in a world that allows itself to be understood in terms of interact-
ing objects and causally connected events. Quantum mechanics allows us to
conceive of this world as emergent, not from some mystical domain of poten-
tiality, nor by a dynamical process, nor through environmental decoherence,
but by a transition across a dimension that is neither temporal nor spatial, a
transition from a condition of complete indefiniteness and indistinguishabil-
ity to a condition of complete or maximal definiteness and distinguishability.
The least definite stage of this transition, probed by high-energy physics, is
known to us through correlations between the counterfactual clicks of non-
existent detectors, i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states
and out-states. At energies low enough for atoms to be stable, it becomes
possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers of components, and these
we describe in terms of correlations between the possible outcomes of un-
performed measurements.14 Molecules, arising at the next stage, are the
14As always, we ought to keep in mind that saying that an atom is “in” a certain
quantum state is the same as saying that certain measurements have been made, and
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first objects with forms that can be visualized—their atomic configurations.
But it is only the finished product—the manifested world, which allows it-
self to be understood in terms of interacting objects and causally connected
events—that gives us the actual detector clicks and the actual measurement
outcomes which allow us to study the correlations in terms of which quantum
mechanics describes the various stages of the process of manifestation.
There is then a two-fold relation between the macroscopic world and
the reality from which it emerges. On the one hand, as Falkenburg has so
convincingly argued, “to our present knowledge subatomic reality is not a
micro-world on its own but a part of empirical reality that exists relative
to the macroscopic world, in given experimental arrangements and well-
defined physical contexts outside the laboratory” [1, p. 340]. Subatomic
reality is linked to the manifested world through a generalized correspon-
dence principle—“a semantic principle of continuity which guarantees that
the predicates for physical properties such as ‘position’, ‘momentum’, ‘mass’,
‘energy’, etc., can also be defined in the domain of quantum mechanics, and
that one may interpret them operationally in accordance with classical mea-
surement methods” [1, p. 191]. On the other hand, quantum mechanics al-
lows us to infer an intrinsically undifferentiated (hence unqualifiable) Being,
which manifests the macroscopic world by entering into reflexive relations,
giving rise to increasingly definite and distinguishable structures—identical
particles, non-visualizable atoms, and partly visualizable molecules—which
are instrumental in the process of manifestation. Though this Being must
not be identified with the transcendental (type-I) reality at the origin of our
experience, it seems safe to consider it one of the fundamental, not further
reducible ways in which that reality offers itself to our cognition.
10 Anthropic reasons
But the fact that we find ourselves in a quantum world where
measurement is possible . . . will surely involve the same sort of
explanation as the fact that we find ourselves in a world where
we are able to exist as carbon-based life forms.
— Jeffrey Bub [77, p. 234]
Anthropic reasoning is the general line of argument that some features of
the universe are prerequisites for the existence of X, Y, or Z, and so we
that their outcomes define algorithms that serve to assign probabilities to the possible
outcomes of subsequent measurements. (Since unperformed measurements need not be
capable of being performed, “possible” outcomes need not be capable of being obtained.)
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should not seek to explain them from first principles: they are necessary
consequences of the fact that there is X, Y, or Z. Typical candidates are
intelligent observers, carbon-based life forms, or an “interesting” world, de-
fined by Squires [78] as one that contains chemistry, and typical prerequisites
for their existence are the specific values of certain dimensionless parameters
not accounted for by the standard model and general relativity (SM+GR)
or the cosmological initial conditions. But the range of anthropic arguments
is much wider. When Kant inquired into the conditions of possibility of
empirical knowledge, he engaged in anthropic reasoning. So, at bottom,
did Bohr when he insisted on the necessity of using classical language to
communicate “what we have done and what we have learned” (Refs. [26,
pp. 39, 72, 89] and [27, pp. 3, 24]). More recently, von Weizsa¨cker [15, pp.
176–177] advanced the following hypothesis “as the formulation of a possi-
bility of thought, as a challenge to prove or disprove it”: the “fundamental
postulates of the final closed theory of physics formulate nothing but the
presuppositions for the possibility of experience in general”.15
Instead of taking SM+GR (or some stringy substitute) for granted and
ascertaining the ranges of adjustable parameters or the cosmological initial
conditions necessary for the existence of X, Y, or Z, we might take for granted
the manifestation of a world whose properties allow themselves to be sorted
into causally evolving bundles of re-identifiable individual substances and
ascertain the necessary minimal set of (effective) theories. If Being is to
manifest such a world by entering into reflexive spatial relations, it stands
to reason that these relations will have to obey a more or less specific set of
laws. To find out why the empirically well-tested laws of physics have the
form that they do, we might begin with the necessary existence of reasonably
stable objects occupying finite volumes of space, and we might ask ourselves
what it takes to create such objects out of nothing but spatial relations
between relata that lack spatial extent. To this question the answer is:
quantum mechanics [59, 63]. Quantum mechanics, however, presupposes
the outcome-indicating events it serves to correlate. It is arguable that the
existence of these events (or the existence of a world that conforms to the
classical narrative mode) requires a sufficient variety of chemical elements,
and that this in turn requires the validity of SM+GR, at least as effective
15By “experience” von Weizsa¨cker [15, p. 176] means that “we can learn from the past
for the future,” that “this learning can be formulated in terms of concepts,” and that
“there are therefore . . . recurring events which we can recognize with recognizable words.”
Thus defined, “experience” refers to “the structures necessary for there to be individual
experiences.” An example of a closed theory is “a theory that cannot be improved upon
by means of small changes” [15, p. 156].
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theories [63, 79].
The standard objection to anthropic reasoning is that it is an abdication
of scientists’ responsibility to provide explanations, a cop-out in short. But
this objection can only be raised by mathematical realists, who transmogrify
their calculational tools into a mind-independent reality, nursing the pious
hope that the latter will magically produce a macroscopic world complete
with outcome-indicating events, agents, experience, and the variegated con-
tents of experience. Apart from that, if an explanation can be provided for
a fundamental physical theory, it cannot be provided by a “more fundamen-
tal” theory; the explanation can only be of an anthropic or else teleological
nature.
11 The mystery of experience
Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be con-
scious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the
slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious.
— Jerry A. Fodor [80]
If making sense of quantum physics is one of the biggest challenges in the
philosophy of science today, consciousness and intentionality are among the
biggest challenges in the philosophy of mind. Consciousness is the remark-
able fact that things exist not only independently of us but also for us.
This does not mean that the external world, or some part or aspect of it,
is mirrored in our brains. It means that we perceive the external world via
neural representations in our brains. Intentionality is the remarkable fact
that instead of perceiving neural representations in our brains, we perceive
things existing outside of our brains.
The so-called hard problem of consciousness [45] is generally understood
to be the question how physical processes in a brain give rise to the various
sensory qualities of the experienced world, complete with the impression
of being an experiencing self or subject. Thus understood, the problem is
misconceived.16 To the extent we are in a position to know the physical or
neural processes occurring in a brain, they belong to the empirical (type-II)
reality constructed by us on the basis of our experience, rather than to the
16There is no mystery about how this problem becomes a mystery. We seize upon
quantitative regularities we find in our experience, we think of them as the laws that govern
a mind-independent world of interacting objects having purely quantitative properties, and
then we marvel how such a world can contain the quality-rich experience we discarded when
we modeled it as a system of interacting objects having purely quantitative properties.
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transcendental (type-II) reality at the origin of our experience. If, on the
other hand, by “physical processes” we mean processes that do give rise to
conscious experience, we have no clue as to what they might be, belonging
as they do to a reality that is epistemically inaccessible to us.
As the causality that relates objects and events across space and time
throws no light on the process of manifestation, so it cannot explain how, by
what magic, the manifested world comes to exist for us. Quantum mechan-
ics throws light on the process of manifestation, but it too knows nothing of
how the manifested world can exist for us.17 Anthropic arguments go a long
way towards explaining why the well-tested laws of physics have the form
that they do, but insofar as they begin with experience and inquire into the
preconditions of its possibility,18 or begin with an intrinsically undifferenti-
ated Being manifesting an empirically knowable world with communicable
features by entering into reflexive spatial relations, they obviously cannot
enlighten us as to the “wherefrom, wherein, and whereto of experience” [82].
The most promising alternative to materialist reductionism in the phi-
losophy of mind is panpsychism, which has a growing number of advo-
cates among contemporary philosophers [83, 84, 85, 86, 87]. Matter, von
Weizsa¨cker once remarked [15, p. 234], can only be defined as “that which
satisfies the laws of physics.” As regards its intrinsic nature, we are clueless.
Panpsychism holds that consciousness is, or is part of, the intrinsic nature
of “that which satisfies the laws of physics.” The cogency of this doctrine
depends on what else is assumed. If we assume with Teilhard de Chardin
that what satisfies the laws of physics is corpuscles, then we are, as he wrote,
“logically forced to assume the existence in rudimentary form . . . of some
sort of psyche in every corpuscle” [88, p. 301]. William James reasoned along
similar lines. Each atom of matter has an atom of consciousness linked with
it, and “just as the material atoms have formed bodies and brains by mass-
ing themselves together,” he wrote [89, pp. 148–149], “so the mental atoms
. . . have fused into those larger consciousnesses which we know in ourselves
and suppose to exist in our fellow-animals.” The difficulty with this version
of panpsychism is that it is hard to see how our rich internal lives could
17While the “neural correlates of consciousness” are generally sought among the classi-
cally describable aspects of brains, some have sought them among non-classical constructs
such as quantum-gravity induced collapses of wavefunctions in microtubules [81]. This,
however, does nothing to explain how a merely quantitatively determined reality can give
rise to sensory qualities, let alone to the conscious subject for whom they exist.
18Says Kant [25, p. 136]: “There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with
experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened . . . to work up the raw
material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience?”
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emerge from the rudimentary psyches of material atoms.
Another line of reasoning leads to a similar conclusion. Beginning with
Leibniz in the 17th Century, philosophers have argued that all physical prop-
erties are relational or extrinsic, and none are in a fundamental sense non-
relational or intrinsic. This offers the possibility of situating consciousness
among the intrinsic properties of the relata which bear the relational prop-
erties. This possibility was considered by Bertrand Russell [90] and more
recently by Chalmers [45]. The problem with this possibility is that it is
hard to imagine how the consciousnesses of a myriad of particles can con-
stitute the unified consciousness that we enjoy. If, however, we take into
account not only that all physical properties are relational but also that all
relational properties are reflexive, so that the relata are identically the same
Being, the idea that consciousness is an intrinsic aspect of the relata comes
into its own, and so does the idea that consciousness is, or is part of, the
intrinsic nature of “that which satisfies the laws of physics.”
If Being is one of transcendental reality’s fundamental, not further re-
ducible aspects, Consciousness (with an equally deserved uppercase C) may
well be another, complementary fundamental aspect of the same intrinsically
unknowable reality. We have said that Being, by entering into reflexive spa-
tial relations, manifests the world, but it may be more accurate to say that
transcendental reality manifests the world to itself, and that in doing so it
takes on the complementary aspects of Being (which manifests the world)
and Consciousness (to which the world is manifested). To our cognition it
features both as the single substance constituting the world and as the single
consciousness containing the world. The only way knowledge and experience
are possible—the only way the explanatory gap between object and subject
[91] can be bridged—may well be that ultimately there is no gap because
ultimately all knowledge is self-knowledge.
But then we have to explain how a single consciousness containing the
world appears to fracture into a multitude of separate conscious subjects,
a subjective process that mirrors the objective self-differentiation of Being
into an apparent multitude of particles, achieved by Being’s entering into
reflexive spatial relations. What is to be explained, therefore, is not only
how Being enters into reflexive spatial relations but also how Consciousness
appears to fracture into separate conscious subjects. The good news is that
there is a single story that furnishes both explanations: while we cannot get
consciousness out of transcendental reality’s objective aspect of Being, we
can get both individual subjects and a multitude of particles out of tran-
scendental reality’s subjective aspect of Consciousness. That story, couched
in the conceptual framework of the previously mentioned philosophy of the
30
Upanishads [71, 72, 73] (note 12), is the story of involution [92, 93]—the
process which has set the stage for the adventure of evolution.
12 Involution
Matter, which we can now define only as that which satisfies
the laws of physics, may be spirit insofar as the spirit can be
objectified. — Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker [15, p. 234]
In a sense, the whole of creation may be said to be a movement
between two involutions, Spirit in which all is involved and out of
which all evolves downward to the other pole of Matter, Matter
in which also all is involved and out of which all evolves upward
to the other pole of Spirit. — Sri Aurobindo [92, p. 137]
Here is how that story goes. Transcendental reality’s intrinsic nature is
a¯nanda, a Sanskrit term that transcends the subject–object dichotomy.
While it is usually rendered in subjective terms, as an infinite Delight or
Bliss, it can also be rendered in objective terms, as an infinite Quality or
Value. Transcendental reality has the power to manifest its inherent Qual-
ity/Delight in finite forms, and the closest description of this manifestation
available to us is that of a Consciousness creating its own content.
In the original creative poise, Being and Consciousness are undifferenti-
ated. There is but one self or subject, which is coextensive with the content
of its consciousness and identical with the substance that constitutes the
content.
A first self-modification of this creative poise gives rise to a new poise of
relation between Consciousness/Being and its manifestation. In this poise
the self adopts a multitude of standpoints within the content of its con-
sciousness. It views this content from a multitude of locations. It thereby
takes on the aspect of a multitude of subjects that are objects for each other.
There now exists a distance between the perceiver and the perceived, and
each object is seen from outside, in perspective. It is here, in this secondary
creative poise, that the dichotomy of subject and object becomes a reality. It
is also in here that the familiar three dimensions of space—viewer-centered
depth and lateral extent—come into existence.
The process that gives rise to a multitude of conscious beings may be
described as a multiple concentration of consciousness. A further departure
from the original creative poise ensues when this multiple concentration of
consciousness becomes exclusive. Here, at last, is something with which we
31
are familiar. For we all know the phenomenon of exclusive concentration,
when our consciousness is focused on a single object or task, while other
goings-on are registered subconsciously, if at all. A similar phenomenon
reduces the single self, which creates and experiences the content of its
consciousness from a multitude of locations, to individuals who have lost
sight of their identity with that single self. One result of this loss of identity
is that the individual self, confined to a particular standpoint, no longer
commands the creative process in its entirety.
The creative process, objectively described, is the process by which infi-
nite Quality manifests itself in finite forms. It takes place in two stages, the
development of Quality into expressive ideas, and the spontaneous realiza-
tion of each expressive idea by an inherent executive force. In the original
creative poise, the entire process is conscious. Individuals who are no longer
aware of being a single self interacting with itself from a multitude of loca-
tions, also are no longer aware of the infinite Quality/Delight at the heart
of existence. While the characteristic activity of their consciousness remains
the formation of expressive ideas, they receive the qualities their ideas serve
to express from a source of which they are no longer conscious. Their con-
sciousness is closer to the consciousness we are familiar with, but it does not
suffer from the debilitating consequences of an evolutionary past.
A further modification of the relation between infinite Quality/Delight
and its manifestation gives rise to individuals whose characteristic activity is
the execution of ideas rather than their formation, individuals who receive
even the ideas they execute from a subliminal source. And finally, when
the multiple exclusive concentration of consciousness is carried to its logical
conclusion, it results in individuals who also lack the power to execute ideas.
And since this power is responsible for the existence of individual forms, the
result is a multitude of formless individuals, which are none other than the
particles studied by physicists. The stage for the adventure of evolution has
been set. Welcome to the physical world!
13 Outlook
Contemporary evolutionary theorists portray mind as a reality simulator.
It evolved because a faithful reality simulator contributes to an organism’s
fitness for survival, not to its ability to know “the truth.” “Boiled down to
essentials,” Churchland [94] tells us,
a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s:
feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore
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of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should
be in order that the organism may survive. . . . Improvements in
sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier
style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to
the organisms way of life and enhances the organisms chances of
survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.
While I do not believe for a moment that we owe the discovery of general
relativity, quantum mechanics, and the standard model to improvements in
sensorimotor control, I do agree with Nagel [95, p. 10] that
too many hypotheses and systems of thought in philosophy and
elsewhere are based on the bizarre view that we, at this point
in history, are in possession of the basic forms of understanding
needed to comprehend absolutely anything.
While the attitude chastised by Nagel is too presumptuous, Churchland’s
take is too presumptuously modest. We tend to think of the evolution of
consciousness as the successive emergence of increasingly adequate ways of
experiencing a world that exists in itself, out of relation to any kind of
experience. But such a world may not exist. There may only be different
ways in which transcendental reality presents itself to itself. A new way of
experiencing the world would then be tantamount to the creation of a new
world [96, 97].
Our very concepts of space, time, and matter are conditioned by the
manner in which we, at this point in history, experience the world. If evo-
lution consists essentially in the emergence of new ways of experiencing
the world, then it is not matter that has created consciousness19; it is con-
sciousness that has created matter, first by carrying its multiple exclusive
concentration to the point of being involved in a multitude of formless par-
ticles, and again by evolving our present mode of experiencing the world,
for this has given us the ability to integrate images into three-dimensional
objects from which the experiencing subject can abstract itself.
There are earlier expressions of human consciousness which reveal how
our present mode of consciousness differs from the earlier modes. Consider,
for instance, the ancient notion that the world is contained in a sphere,
which has the fixed stars attached to its boundary, the firmament. We
19The discussion by Hut et al. [98] of the math-matter-mind triangle is relevant in this
context. The triangle suggests the circularity of the widespread view that mathematics is
a creation of mind, mind arises out of matter, and matter is governed by mathematical
laws.
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cannot but ask: what is outside that sphere? Those who held this notion
could not, because for them the third dimension of space—viewer-centered
depth—did not at all have the reality that it has for us [97]. This is why
they could not handle perspective in drawing or painting, and why they were
unable to arrive at the subject-free stance which is a prerequisite of modern
science—all this became possible only during the Renaissance.
It stands to reason that modes of experience will evolve that will differ
from our present mode as much if not more than our present mode dif-
fers from earlier ones. Our present mode has enabled us to discover much
that is relevant to understanding the evolutionary past, but its tendency
to regard its experience of the world as the definite experience prevents us
from envisioning a mode of experience that transcends our present time-
and space-bound mode. As our present mode of experience has enriched the
pre-scientific mode with a new experiential dimension, so will the next mode
enrich our present mode, with the likely result that our present, scientific
understanding of the world will come to seem as dated as the mythological
understanding of the pre-scientific era seems today. And, conversely, just as
the mythological understanding could not foresee the technological explo-
sion made possible by science, so our scientific imagination is incapable of
foreseeing the radical changes that could be wrought by the evolution of a
new mode of experience.
The interpretation of the formal apparatus of a physical theory such a
quantum mechanics does not take place in a conceptual vacuum. Just as
science in general operates within a metaphysical framework that formulates
the questions it seeks to answer, and that interprets the answers it obtains
through experiment and observation, so every interpretation of quantum
mechanics takes place in an already given metaphysical framework. My
purpose in engaging in the above speculations was to show that a meta-
physical framework capable of doing justice to quantum mechanics may be
considerably more complex and wide-ranging than we are generally prepared
to envision. Quantum mechanics may actually play a relatively minor role
in such a framework. It may be no more than a necessary precondition of
the Spirit’s adventure of evolution.
The purpose of this paper was, inter alia, to demonstrate the sanity
of making room for richer, more sophisticated, and I dare say more real-
istic relations between experience, its subjects, and its objects. An objec-
tivist fundamentalism—be it the ψ-ontology of the quantum philosopher or
the physicalism of the cognitive scientist—leaves the problems pertaining
to these relations in a state of chronic insolubility. The subjectivist funda-
mentalism of the QBist fares not much better, reducing as it does the real
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object “out there” to the “little more” [54] that compels the correlations
between experienced measurement outcomes to obey the laws of quantum
mechanics. Neither the third-person singular quantum mechanics fixated
on a self-existent, mind-independent world20 nor the first-person singular
quantum mechanics of the QBist treats the objective world with the respect
it demands and deserves. This becomes possible only by (to begin with)
driving a “Kantian wedge” between the objects of our investigations and
whatever it is that induces experiences in us.
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